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We explore a generalization of quantum secret sharing (QSS) in which classical shares play a
complementary role to quantum shares, exploring further consequences of an idea first studied by
Nascimento, Mueller-Quade and Imai (Phys. Rev. A64 042311 (2001)). We examine three ways,
termed inflation, compression and twin-thresholding, by which the proportion of classical shares can
be augmented. This has the important application that it reduces quantum (information processing)
players by replacing them with their classical counterparts, thereby making quantum secret sharing
considerably easier and less expensive to implement in a practical setting. In compression, a QSS
scheme is turned into an equivalent scheme with fewer quantum players, compensated for by suitable
classical shares. In inflation, a QSS scheme is enlarged by adding only classical shares and players.
In a twin-threshold scheme, we invoke two separate thresholds for classical and quantum shares
based on the idea of information dilution.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION:
Suppose the president of a bank, Alice, wants to give access to a vault to two vice-presidents, Bob and Charlie,
whom she does not entirely trust. Instead of giving the combination to any one of them, she may desire to distribute
the information in such a way that no vice-president alone has any knowledge of the combination, but both of them can
jointly determine the combination. Cryptography provides the answer to this question in the form of secret sharing
[1, 2]. In this scheme, some sensitive data is distributed among a number of parties such that certain authorized
sets of parties can access the data, but no other combination of players. A particularly symmetric variety of secret
splitting (sharing) is called a threshold scheme: in a (k, n) classical threshold scheme (CTS), the secret is split up
into n pieces (shares), of which any k shares form a set authorized to reconstruct the secret, while any set of k− 1 or
fewer shares has no information about the secret. Blakely [3] and Shamir [4] showed that CTS’s exist for all values of
k and n with n ≥ k. By concatenating threshold schemes, one can construct arbitrary access structures, subject only
to the condition of monotonicity (ie., sets containing authorized sets should also be authorized) [5]. Hillery et al. [6]
and Karlsson et al. [7] proposed methods for implementing CTSs that use quantum information to transmit shares
securely in the presence of eavesdroppers.
Subsequently, extending the above idea to the quantum case, Cleve, Gottesman and Lo [8] proposed a (k, n) quantum
threshold scheme (QTS) as a method to split up an unknown secret quantum state |S〉 into n pieces (shares) with the
restriction that k > n/2 (for if this inequality were violated, two disjoint sets of players can reconstruct the secret, in
violation of the quantum no-cloning theorem [9]). The notion of QTS is based on quantum erasure correction [10, 11].
QSS has been extended beyond QTS to general access structures [12, 13], but here the no-cloning theorem implies that
none of the authorized sets shall be mutually disjoint. Potential applications of QSS include creating joint checking
accounts containing quantum money [14], or share hard-to-create ancilla states [12], or perform secure distributed
quantum computation [15]. Implementing QSS is well within current technology [16], and has been demonstrated by
a recent experiment [17].
In conventional QSS schemes, it is often implicitly assumed that all share-holders carry and process quantum
information. Given the fragile nature of quantum information, this can often be difficult and expensive from a
practical viewpoint. Fortunately, it turns out to be possible sometimes to construct an equivalent scheme in which
some share holders carry only classical information and no quantum information, an idea first studied by Nascimeto
et al. [18]. Our work is dedicated to exploring further consequences of this idea. It is of considerable importance
to consider ways in which the proportion of classical shares and classical information processing can be increased in
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2realizing a QSS scheme. Furthermore, hybrid (classical-quantum) QSS can potentially avail of features available to
classical secret sharing such as share renewal [19], secret sharing with prevention [20] and disenrolment [21].
In particular, our work is aimed at studying ways to augment the proportion of classical shares in different ways for
various situations in QSS. As pointed out above, the main purpose of this exercise is to render practical implementation
easier and less expensive. In Section II, we present some basic ways to introduce a classical information component
into QSS. In Section III, we discuss how this can be used to ‘compress’ a QSS, that is, reduce the proportion of
quantum information carrying players. In Section IV, we show how a QSS scheme can be ‘inflated’ by adding only
classical shares. In Section V, we invoke two separate thresholds for classical and quantum shares based on the idea
of information dilution. This generalizes the idea of conventional single threshold QSS schemes and is again shown to
lead to savings of quantum players.
II. HYBRIDIZING QUANTUM SECRET SHARING SCHEMES
The essential method to hybridize (i.e., to introduce classical shares into) QSS is to somehow incorporate classical
information that is needed to decrypt or prepare the quantum secret as classical shares. Use of classical shares can
sometimes obviate and thus lead to savings in quantum shares, or, at any rate, quantum players. A simple instance
of such classical information is the ordering information of the shares. In QTS, it is implicity assumed that the share-
holders know the coordinates of the shares in the secret, i.e., they know who is holding the first qubit, who the second
and so on. This ordering information is necessary to reconstruct the secret, without which successful reconstruction
of the secret is not guaranteed. If we wish to make use of this ordering information in the above sense, then only
quantum error correction based secret sharing where lack of ordering information leads to maximal ignorance can be
used. In particular, the scheme should be sensitive to the interchange of two or more qubits. For example, let us
consider a (2, 3)-QTS. The secret here is an arbitrary qutrit and the encoding maps the secret qutrit to three qutrits
as:
α|0〉+ β|1〉+ γ|2〉 7−→ α(|000〉+ |111〉+ |222〉) + β(|012〉+ |120〉+ |201〉) + γ(|021〉+ |210〉+ |102〉), (1)
and each qutrit is taken as a share. While from a single share no information can be obtained, two shares, with ordering
information, suffice to reconstruct the encoded state [8]. However, the lack of ordering information does not always
lead to maximal ignorance about the secret. Note that the structure of the above code is such that any interchange
of two qubits leaves an encoded |0〉 intact but interchanges |1〉 and |2〉. Thus, a secret like |0〉 or (1/√2)(|1〉+ |2〉) can
be entirely reconstructed without the ordering information. Therefore, only the subset of quantum error correction
codes admissible in QSS that do not possess such symmetry properties can be used if the scheme is to be sensitive to
ordering information.
Another scheme relevant here is due to Nascimento et al. [18], based on qubit encryption [22]. We adopt this method
to generate the relevant encrypting classical information. However, in principle any classical data whose suppression
leads to maximal ignorance of the secret is also good. Elsewhere, in Section V, we consider another way. Quantum
encryption works as follows: suppose we have a n-qubit quantum state |ψ〉 and random sequenceK of 2n classical bits.
Each sequential pair of classical bit is associated with a qubit and determines which transformation σˆ ∈ {Iˆ , σˆx, σˆy, σˆz}
is applied to the respective qubit. If the pair is 00, Iˆ is applied, if it is 01, σˆx is applied, and so on. To one not knowing
K, the resulting |ψ˜〉 is a complete mixture and no information can be extracted out of it because the encryption leaves
any pure state in a maximally mixed state, that is: (1/4)(Iˆ|S〉〈S|Iˆ+ σˆx|S〉〈S|σˆx+ σˆy|S〉〈S|σˆy+ σˆz|S〉〈S|σˆz) = (1/2)Iˆ.
However, with knowledge of K the sequence of operations can be reversed and |ψ〉 recovered. Therefore, classical
data can be used to encrypt quantum data. In general, given d dimensional objects, quantum encryption requires
d2 operators and a key of 2 log(d) bits per object to randomize perfectly. In practice, such quantum operations may
prove costly, and only near-perfect security may be sufficient. In this case, there exists a set of roughly d log(d) unitary
operators whose average effect on every input pure state is almost perfectly randomizing, so that the size of the key
can be reduced by about a factor of two [23].
III. COMPRESSING QUANTUM SECRET SHARING SCHEMES
In hybrid QSS, the quantum secret is split up into quantum and classical shares of information. We call the former
q-shares, and the latter c-shares. A player holding only c-shares is called a c-player or c-member. Otherwise, she or
he is a q-player or q-member.
Definition 1 A QSS scheme realizing an access structure Γ = {α1, α2, · · · , αr} among a set of players P =
{P1, P2, · · · , Pn} is said to be compressible if fewer than n q-players are sufficient to implement it.
3Here the αi’s are the minimal authorized sets of players. Knowledge of compressibility helps us decide how to minimize
valuable quantum resources needed for implementing a given QSS scheme. As an example of compression by means
of hybrid QSS, suppose we want to split a quantum secret |S〉 among a set of players P = {A,B,C,D,E, F} realizing
the access structure Γ = {ABC,AD,AEF}. That is, the only sets authorized to reconstruct the secret are {A,B,C},
{A,D} and {A,E, F} and sets containing them, whilst any other set is unauthorized to do so. For distributing the
secret, we encrypt |S〉 using the quantum encryption method (described above) with classical key K into a new state
|S˜〉 and give |S˜〉 to A. We then split up K using a CSS scheme that realizes Γ. Player A cannot recover |S〉 from |S˜〉
because he cannot unscramble it without K. Only the αj ’s, and sets containing them, can recover the classical key
K, and thence decrypt the secret state. In this way, by means of a hybrid (classical-quantum) secret-sharing scheme,
we can compress the original QSS scheme into an equivalent one in which fewer players need to handle quantum
information.
We use the notation of single parantheses (double parantheses) to indicate CTS (QTS). In a conventional ((k, n))
scheme, a compression is known to be possible if 2k > n + 1, in which case, the scheme can be compressed into
a ((k − γ, n − γ)) scheme combined with a (k, n) scheme, where γ ≡ 2k − n − 1 [18]. A general access structure
Γ = {α1, α2, · · · , αr} can be realized by a first layer of (1, r)-threshold scheme. In the quantum case, since this
violates the no-cloning theorem, it is replaced by the majority function ((r, 2r − 1)) scheme [12]. This, again, is
incompressible. However, in the second layer of the construction, the ((|αi|, |αi|)) schemes can be replaced with a
((1, 1)) schemes combined with (|αi|, |αi|) schemes [18].
In the above, the degree of compression is determined by Γ = {α1, · · · , αr} and the requirement to minimize q-
players, no matter who they are. This can be distorted if the information processing capabilities of individual players
are known to be different. In particular, suppose we are given a set Q, such that players from this set are able to
process quantum information reliably. The set of remaining players Q¯ = P −Q are best designated to be c-players. A
‘hitting set’ H(Γ) for the collection of sets Γ is a set of players such that H∩αi 6= ∅ ∀ i (1 ≤ i ≤ r). LetM(Γ) be the
smallest hitting set for Γ such that M(Γ) ⊂ Q. M(Γ) may or may not be unique. We denote M ≡ |M(Γ)|. Under
compression, only M q-players are needed. First a majority function ((r, 2r − 1)) is employed, r of the shares being
encrypted and deposited with the M q-players. In the second layer of the construction, the ((|αi|, |αi|)) schemes can
be compressed to ((1, 1)) schemes combined with (|αi|, |αi|) schemes, the q-shares of each αi being deposited with the
respective q-player. The remaining M − 1 shares are split-shared according to a maximal scheme that contains Γ.
The maximal scheme is obtained by adding authorized sets to Γ until authorized and unauthorized sets form exact
complements [12]. Thus we require onlyM ≤ |P| q-players to implement the protocol, which represents a compression
by |P| −M q-players. We note that if M(Γ) = ∅, then compression is impossible. We can observe that for a general
access structure involving a large number of players, computing M is a provably hard problem (In fact its decision
version can be shown to be NP-Complete [25, 26]).
As an example, let us consider the access structure Γ = {ABCD,ADF,CDE} among six players P =
{A,B,C,D,E, F}. Suppose Q = {A,C,E}. We can choose M = {A,C} or M = {A,E}, representing the two
required q-players (instead of six q-players, required in the uncompressed version). Suppose we choose the latter.
The first layer will employ a (3, 5)-QTS to split secret |S〉. At the second layer, the share on the top two rows are
encrypted using K1,K2 and given to A, the last using K3 and given to E. The Kj’s are classically shared on each row,
though the q-shares remains with A or E. The last share |S′〉 is shared using a pure state scheme that implements
Γmax, the maximal scheme obtained from Γ. The resultant q-shares for each authorized set αj are deposited with
αj ∩M(Γ). This scheme is depicted in Eq. (2).
((3, 5))


A → (4, 4) : A,B,C,D
A → (3, 3) : A,D, F
E → (3, 3) : C,D,E
|S′〉
(2)
We note that if D ∈ Q then M(Γ) = {D}, and only one q-player, namely D, would have sufficed to implement
compression. And if Q = {E,F}, then M = ∅ because there is an authorized set with no q-player. Hence no
compression would be possible.
IV. INFLATING QUANTUM SECRET SHARING SCHEMES
The question, how to augment or “inflate” a given QSS scheme keeping the quantum component fixed, is considered
herebelow. This is of practical relevance if we wish to expand a given QSS scheme by including new players who do
not have (reliable) quantum information processing capacity. To this end, we now define an inflatable QSS.
Definition 2 A QSS(Γ) scheme realizing an access structure Γ = {α1, α2, · · · , αr} among a set of players P =
4{P1, P2, · · · , Pn} is inflatable if n can be increased for fixed number of q-players to form a new QSS(Γ′) such that
Γ′|P = Γ, where Γ′|P denotes the restriction of Γ′ to P.
Clearly, inflation involves the addition of classical information carrying c-players. The additional shares required for
them will be c-shares, so that q-shares may remain fixed at m. The following theorem answers the question when a
QSS scheme can be inflated.
Theorem 1 A QSS scheme realizing an access structure Γ = {α1, α2, · · · , αr} among a set of players P =
{P1, P2, · · · , Pn} can always be inflated.
Proof. Consider the addition of m new players, Pn+1, · · ·Pn+m, where m ≥ 1. The new set of all players are
P ′ ≡ {P1, P2, · · · , Pn+m}. A new access structure Γ′ = {α′1, · · · , α′r} can be obtained by arbitrarily adding the new
players to any of the αj ’s. Clearly, Γ
′ will not violate the no-cloning theorem, since Γ does not. The secret |S〉 is
encrypted using classical string K to obtain |S˜〉. This encrypted secret is split-shared according to the original scheme
implementing Γ, while K is split-shared among all n+m players according to the classical scheme implementing Γ′.
To reconstruct the secret, members of any α′j combine the q-shares of αj ⊆ α′j to reconstruct |S˜〉, and the c-shares
with all members of α′j to reconstruct K, using which the encrypted secret |S˜〉 is decrypted to |S〉. The new scheme
is such that Γ = Γ′|P and P ′−P are c-players. Therefore, the new scheme QSS(Γ′) is an inflation of the given scheme
QSS(Γ). 
The above theorem only says that that any QSS scheme can be inflated in some way. A specific problem is whether
a given (k, n)-QTS can be inflated to another QTS. This is considered in the following theorem and corollary.
Theorem 2 A (k, n)-QTS can be inflated only conformally, ie., to threshold schemes having the form (k + γ, n+ γ),
where γ (≥ 0) is an integer.
Proof. If the given (k, n)-QTS satisfies the no-cloning theorem, then clearly so will the (k + γk, n+ γn)-QTS, where
γk ≥ γn ≥ 0 and k+γk ≤ n+γn. Further, according to Lemma 1 of Ref. [18], a restriction of the (k+γk, n+γn)-QTS
by γ players necessarily yields a conformally reduced, (k + γk − γ, n + γn − γ)-QTS. The restricted scheme has a
different access structure from (k, n)-QTS unless γk = γn = γ. Therefore, only a conformal inflation of (k, n)-QTS is
possible, whereby it is inflated to a (k + γ, n+ γ)-QTS by the addition of γ c-players. 
In an implementation of Theorem 2, the quantum secret |S〉 is encrypted to |S˜〉 using a classical string K which is
split-shared among all n+γ players according to a (k + γ, n+ γ)-CTS. State |S˜〉 is then quantally split-shared among
the n q-players according to a (k, n)-QTS. As a consequence of Theorem 2, we have the following negative result:
Corollary 1 A (k, n)-QTS cannot be inflated at constant threshold. 
V. TWIN-THRESHOLD QUANTUM SECRET SHARING SCHEMES
In a conventional or compressed (k, n)-QTS, the threshold k applies to all members taken together. Now suppose
that we have separate thresholds for c-members and q-members, namely kc and kq, with k = kc+kq. We now extend the
definition of a conventional QTS to a (kc, kq, n) quantum twin-threshold scheme (Q2TS) and a (kc, kq, n,C) quantum
twin-threshold scheme with common set (Q2TS+C), where a quantum secret |S〉 is split into n pieces (shares) according
to some pre-agreed procedure and distributed among n players. These n share-holders consist of members of set Q of
q-players and set Q¯ of c-players. We denote q ≡ |Q|, so that |Q¯| = n− q. Obviously, in a quantum scheme, Q 6= ∅.
Definition 3 A QSS scheme is a (kc, kq, n) quantum twin-threshold scheme (Q2TS) among n players, of which q are
q-players and the remaining are c-players, if at least kc c-players and at least kq q-players are necessary to reconstruct
the secret.
Definition 4 A QSS scheme is a (kc, kq, n,C) quantum twin-threshold scheme with common set (Q2TS+C) among n
players, of which q are q-players and the remaining are c-players, if: (a) at least kc c-players and at least kq q-players
are necessary to reconstruct the secret; (b) All members of the set C are necessary to reconstruct the secret.
The idea behind distinguishing between the classical threshold kc and the quantum threshold kq is to obtain a
simple generalization that combines the properties of the CTS and QTS. Practically speaking, it is best to minimize
kq, at fixed k. However, one can in principle consider situations of potential use for a twin-threshold scheme, when
5a sufficiently large number of members are able to process quantum information safely. Further, some of the share-
holders, while not entirely trust-worthy, may yet be more trust-worthy than others. The share-dealer (say Alice) may
prefer to include all such share-holders during any reconstruction of the secret. This is the requirement that motivates
the introduction of set C. In general, C can contain members drawn from Q and/or Q¯ or may be a null set. By
definition, Q2TS+C with C = ∅ is Q2TS.
In the following sections we present two methods to realize in varying degrees the generalized quantum secret
splitting scheme. The first of these is the general version of Q2TS+C. The second, while more restricted, is interesting
because it is not directly based on quantum erasure correction, but on information dilution via homogenization, in
contrast to current proposals of QSS.
A. Quantum error correction and quantum encryption
We now give protocols that realizes the twin-threshold scheme based on quantum encryption.
Scheme 1. Protocol to realize (kc, kq, n)-Q2TS.
Distribution phase. (1) Choose a random classical encryption K. Encrypt the quantum secret |S〉 using the
encryption algorithm described in Section I. The encrypted state is denoted |S˜〉; (2) Using a conventional (kq, q)-
QTS, split-share |S˜〉 among the members of Q; to not violate no-cloning, q should satisfy kq > (q/2); (3) Using a
(kc, n− q)-CTS, split-share K among the members of Q¯.
Reconstruction phase. (1) Collect any kq q-shares from members of Q and reconstruct |S˜〉; (2) Collect any kc shares
from members of Q¯ and reconstruct K; (3) Reconstruct |S〉 using |S˜〉 and K.
Now consider the case C 6= ∅ and the Q2TS scheme becomes the more general Q2TS+C scheme. We now give a
protocol that realizes this more general twin-threshold scheme. We denote λq ≡ |Q ∩ C| and λc ≡ |Q¯ ∩ C|. Clearly,
λc + λq = |C|. If there are no q-players in C, set λq = 0, and if there are no c-players in C, set λc = 0. Note that by
definition, q-players may also carry classical information, but c-players don’t carry quantum information.
Scheme 2. Protocol to realize (kc, kq, n,C)-Q2TS+C.
Distribution phase. (1) Choose a random classical encryption K. Encrypt the quantum secret |S〉 using the
encryption algorithm described in Section I. The encrypted state is denoted |S˜〉; (2) Using a (2, 2)-QTS, divide |S˜〉
into two pieces, say |S˜1〉 and |S˜2〉; (3) Using a (λq, λq)-QTS, split |S˜1〉 among the q-members in C; (4) Using a
conventional (kq − λq , q − λq)-QTS, split |S˜2〉 among the q-members not in C; to not violate no-cloning, q should
satisfy (kq − λq) > (q − λq)/2; (5) Using a (2,2)-CTS, divide K into two shares, say K1 and K2; (6) Part K1 is
split among the members of C using a (|C|, |C|)-CTS. Alternatively, it can be split using a (λc, λc)-CTS among the
c-players in C; (7) Using a (kc − λc, n− q − λc)-CTS, split K2 among the members of Q¯− C.
Reconstruction phase. (1) Collect all λq shares from all members of Q ∩ C and reconstruct |S˜1〉; (2) Collect any
kq − λq q-shares from Q − C to reconstruct |S˜2〉; (3) Combining |S˜1〉 and |S˜2〉, reconstruct |S˜〉; (4) Collect all |C|
c-shares from members of C and reconstruct K1. Alternatively, collect all λc c-shares from members of Q¯ ∩ C and
reconstruct K1; (5) Collect any kc−λc shares from Q¯−C and reconstruct K2; (6) Combining K1 and K2, reconstruct
K. (7) Reconstruct |S〉 using |S˜〉 and K.
B. Quantum twin-threshold scheme based on information dilution via homogenization
The second, more restrictive scheme, is based on the procedure for information dilution in a system-reservoir
interaction, proposed by Ziman et al. [27]. The novelty of the scheme lies in the fact that it is not directly based on
an quantum error-correction code. However, it is applicable only to QSS with C 6= ∅. Ref. [27] present a universal
quantum homogenizer, a machine that takes as input a system qubit initially in the state ρ and a set of N reservoir
qubits initially prepared in the identical state ξ. In the homogenizer the system qubit sequentially interacts with the
reservoir qubits via the partial swap operation so that the initial state ρ
(0)
S of the system, after interacting with the
N reservoir qubits, becomes:
ρ(N) = TrR
[
UN · · ·U1(ρ(0)S ⊗ ξ⊗N )U †1 · · ·U †N
]
(3)
where Uk ≡ U ⊗ (⊗j 6=kIj) describes the interaction between the kth qubit of the reservoir and the system qubit. The
homogenizer realizes, in the limit sense, the transformation such that at the output each qubit is in an arbitrarily
6small neighborhood of the state ξ irrespective of the initial states of the system and the reservoir qubits. Formally,
D(ρ
(N)
S , ξ) ≤ δ, ∀N ≥ Nδ, (4a)
D(ξ′k, ξ) ≤ δ, ∀1 ≤ k ≤ N, (4b)
where D(·, ·) denotes some distance (eg., a trace norm) between the states, δ > 0 is a small parameter chosen a priori
and ξ′k ≡ TrS [Uρ(k−1)S ⊗ ξU †].
The interaction between a reservoir qubit and the system qubit is given by the partial swap operation P (η) =
(cos η)I+ i(sin η)S, where S, the swap operator acting on the state of two qubits is defined by S|ψ〉 ⊗ |φ〉 = |φ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉.
It can be shown that η can be chosen to enforce Eq. (4a) according to the relation:
sin η ≤
√
δ/2. (5)
Thus the information contained in the unknown system state is distributed in the correlations amongst the system
and the reservoir qubits, whose marginal states are close to ξ. As the authors point out, this process can be used as
a quantum safe with a classical combination.
Now we show how this particular feature can be turned into a special case of the (kc, kq, n,C) threshold scheme,
subject to the restriction that Q ⊆ C, so that kq = q, i.e. all q-players must be present to reconstruct the secret. The
homogenization is reversible and the original state of the system and the reservoir qubits can be unwound. Perfect
unwinding can be performed only when the system particle is correctly identified from among the N+1 output qubits,
and it and the reservoir qubits interact via the inverse of the original partial swap operation. Therefore, in order to
unwind the homogenized system, the classical information (denoted K) about the sequence of the qubit interactions
is essential. Now, of the (N + 1)! possible orderings, only one will reverse the original process. The probability to
choose the system qubit correctly is 1/(N + 1). Even when the particle is choosen successfully, there are still N !
different possibilities in choosing the sequence of interaction with the reservoir qubits. Thus, without the knowledge
of the correct ordering, the probability of successfully unwinding the homogenization transformation is 1/((N + 1)!),
which is exponentially small in N . Moreover, a particular order of trial unwinding and measurement will irrecoverably
destroy the system. This is demonstrated in Figures (4) and (5) of Ref. [27], where various wrong permutations of the
ordering, chosen by trial-and-error strategy, are shown not to reproduce the state. So, for sufficiently large value of
N , no information about the system qubit can be deduced without this classical information. Nevertheless, it is worth
noting that the above computational argument, while rendering security of the homogenizing procedure intuitively
understandable and highly plausible, does not rigorously prove it, even in the N →∞ limit.
A secondary wall of security is provided by the smallness of δ. It is useful if players already have knowledge of ξ. In
this case, because of conditions (4a), the homogenized state of the system or reservoir qubit cannot be distinguished
from ξ.
If K is split up among the q members holding the system and reservoir qubits according to a (q, q)-CTS, it is
easy to observe that this realizes a (q, q)-QTS not based directly on a quantum error-correction code. In terms of the
generalized definition, this corresponds to a (kc, kq, n,C)-scheme in which kc = 0, Q = C and n = kq = q. The classical
layer of information sharing is necessary in order to strictly enforce the threshold: if prior ordering information were
openly available, then for example the last q−1 participants could collude to obtain a state close to ρ. We now present
the most general twin-threshold scheme possible based on homogenization. It will still be more restricted than that
obtained via quantum encryption, requiring that Q ⊆ C, so that kq = q. If n is not too large, it is preferable for
prevention of partial information leakage to choose the number N of reservoir qubits such that N ≫ n. The general
protocol is executed recursively as follows.
Scheme 3: Protocol to realize a restricted (kc, kq, n,C)-Q2TS+C, with kq = q ≤ n: Alice takes N (≫ 1) reservoir
qubits, where N + 1 =
∑
imi and integers mi ≥ 1 (∀ i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n), and performs the process of homogenization to
obtain states ξ0, ξ1, · · · ξN on the system qubit and the N reservoir qubits.
Distribution phase: (1) Any mi qubits from N+1 qubits are given to the ith member of Q; (2) K is divided into two
parts, K1 and K2, according to a (2,2)-CTS; (3) Let λc ≡ |Q¯ ∩ C| ≥ 0. K1 is further split among the members of Q
and Q¯ ∩ C using a (q+λc, q+λc)-CTS; (4) K2 is split among the members of Q¯−C using a (kc−λc, n−q−λc)-CTS.
Reconstruction phase: (1) Collect all q-shares from members of Q; (2) Collect all |C| c-shares from members of C
and reconstruct K1; (3) Collect any kc − λc shares from members of Q¯−C to reconstruct K2; (4) Using K1 and K2,
reconstruct K; (5) Using the q-shares and K, unwind the system state to restore the secret |S〉.
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